Journal of Sociology SAGE Journals This study reviews international comparative studies investigating people’s views on inequality. These studies are classified using a framework consisting of three types of conceptions of inequality and two dimensions of inequality. Four perspectives are discussed explaining cross-national differences in views on inequality: the modernist, the culturalist, the micro and the macro perspective. The findings of studies comparing views on inequalities in post-communist and Western states provide more support for the modernist than for the culturalist perspective. Few comparative studies appear to investigate views on inequalities as independent variables impacting on other social attitudes and behaviours. It is argued that the social relevance of the field will be enhanced if more studies can show that views on inequality have an effect on social outcomes complementary to that of objective inequalities. L’étude fait le tour des comparaisons internationales qui ont analysé les opinions sur l’inégalité. On peut les classer à partir de trois conceptions de l’inégalité et de deux dimensions. On obtient en fait quatre modèles qui rendent compte des différences entre nations : le moderniste, le culturaliste, la perspective micro et la perspective macro. Les données comparatives pour les pays ex-communistes et les pays occidentaux s’accordent mieux avec une perspective moderniste que culturaliste. Les études comparatives ont fort peu traité les jugements sur l’inégalité comme variables indépendantes ayant un impact sur d’autres attitudes et comportements sociaux. La pertinence sociale de ce champ d’études serait augmentée si davantage d’études montraient que les jugements sur l’inégalité ont des effets sociaux qui s’ajoutent à ceux des inégalités objectives. Dieser Beitrag interessiert sich für internationale vergleichende Studien, die die Anschauungen über Ungleichheit zum Thema haben. Diese Studien lassen sich in drei Konzepte und zwei Dimensionen von Ungleichheit einteilen. Daraus entstehen vier Modelle, die die unterschiedlichen nationalen Betrachtungsweisen von Ungleichheit erklären: die modernistische Perspektive, die kulturelle Perspektive, die Mikroperspektive und die Makroperspektive. Die vergleichenden Angaben ehemaliger kommunistischer und westlicher Länder stimmen eher mit der modernistischen als mit der kulturalistischen Perspektive überein. Nur wenige der vergleichenden Studien scheinen Ungleichheiten als unabhängige Variablen zu verstehen, die zu anderen sozialen Formen und Verhaltensweisen führen könnten. Die soziale Bedeutung dieses Studienbereichs könnte zunehmen, falls mehrere Untersuchungen zeigen würden, dass die Einstufungen der Ungleichheit soziale Auswirkungen haben, die zu den objektiven Ungleichheiten hinzugefügt werden müssen. Inequality and well-being in OECD countries: What do we know? Is the official journal of The Australian Sociological Association. It carries peer refereed articles of sociological research and theory on issues of int. Book Review Kate O'Loughlin, Collette Browning and Hal Kendig eds, Ageing in Australi. Peta S. Cook.
Why Do Women's Fields of Study Pay Less? A Test of Devaluation. You can share your research paper among other researchers in social networking sites including Facebook, Twitter, Google etc. It is simple just copy the view page link of published paper and share with your friends as shown below. Jun 5, 2014. As men are overrepresented in lucrative fields and women disproportionately graduate from disciplines that yield low wages in the labour market, horizontal sex. European Sociological Review, Volume 30, Issue 4, 1 August 2014, Pages 536–548, https//doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcu060. Published 05 June.
Buy Custom Article Critique Written from Scratch. Sociological research is an integral component of the sociology curriculum. Testing theoretical knowledge in the field is the basis for proving new theories and trends. Students learn about quantitative research methods as well as how to conduct field studies. Department professors are active in many research projects. Mignon Duffy edited, with Amy Armenia (Rollins College) and Clare Stacey (Kent State University), a collection of original research exploring paid care work. The volume, entitled "Caring on the Clock: The Complexities and Contradictions of Paid Care Work," published by Rutgers University Press in fall 2014. Adrian Cruz has an article entitled "Labour Militancy Deferred" in the journal, "Race & Class." Cruz presented a co-authored paper on attitudes and beliefs in regard to Latino immigrants with Kazuyo Kubo (Lesley University) at the annual Eastern Sociological Society conference in Baltimore. In November 2014, he presented another paper on Mexican farm workers in Toronto at the yearly conference for the Social Science History Association. Levon Chorbajian gave talks at Roxbury Community College and Holy Cross College on the impact of neo-liberal policies on public higher education in Massachusetts. In fall 2014, he presented a paper on Turkish denial of the Armenian Genocide at a World War I Centennial Conference at Georgian Court University in Lakewood, N. The paper is one part of a larger book length project on the Turkish denial. Mitra Das is the lead author of the research article “Decades after Resettlement: Later Life Experiences of Aging Cambodian Refugees” published in Humanity and Society 37(4), November 2013. Her piece on “Cambodian Community in Lowell, Massachusetts” was published in "Asian Americans: An Encyclopedia of Social, Cultural, Economic and Political History," 1, 2014. She presented a paper, “An Immigrant’s Story: Bengali Family in the United States” at the International Narrative Conference at MIT, Cambridge, Mass. She is currently working on several writing projects including an auto-ethnography: her personal story as an immigrant traversing between two distinct cultures. She has been invited to be a reviewer for "Choice Magazine," to review academic sources for Asian American Studies. Daniel Egan is working on a study of the role war and military theory play in social theory. His areas of expertise include social theory, social inequality, political sociology, war and peace and globalization. Thomas Piñeros Shields presented at the Harvard University symposium on “Illegality, Youth and Belonging” in October 2013. He has been a member of the planning committee for URBAN and has organized a round table discussion “How Can DREAMers be Partners in Community Based Research? ” at the American Sociology Association (ASA) in San Francisco in August 2014. Paula Rayman conducted research as a visiting scholar at Queens University in Belfast Ireland and at University of Haifa in Israel in fall 2014 on a project entitled, "Building Positive Peace and Gender Equity" that builds upon post-conflict case study material from both Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine and includes interviews with women leaders from nonviolent resistance movements in both regions. In addition Rayman will continue to be director of the Middle East Center for Peace, Development and Culture at UMass Lowell and work with the provost on deepening our partnerships in the region. She is working with the Chancellor's Office on the Women and Public Service Program (WPSP), based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington D. Charlotte Ryan was visiting professor at CUNY School of Public Health, New York City, March 10-11, 2014. She presented a lecture, "Four Models of Strategic Communication in Public Health." On June 25, 2014 Ryan was a visiting lecturer at Brown University’s IPROV program. She introduced IPROV fellows to Lukes’ concepts of Power and Change. She recently published an article, “Acting in Concert: Social Movements’ Contribution to Environmental Communication,” has been accepted for publication in the Handbook of Environmental Communication. It tracks the efforts of the national environmental organization, Green For All, to build networks that create green jobs while addressing climate change. Reflecting on her experiences in service learning, Charlotte Ryan also published “A Bridge is not Just a Metaphor: Building Sustainable Community-university Partnerships through Service Learning Projects,” In Service Sociology and Academic Engagement in Social Problems, Treviño and Mc Cormack, Eds. The "Journal of Poverty" summer 2014 issue features Ryan’s article, “Building Public Will: The Battle for Affordable - and Supportive - Housing” co-authored with Rhode Island homeless rights advocates Jim Rcyzek and Karen Jeffreys. Janelle Diaz, UMass Lowell sociology graduate organized the literature review for the article and is co-author. Ryan has been committed to publishing research with community partners. She is a member of the Urban Publication team working to develop guidelines to facilitate the publication of community-based research now common in public health journals. She presented these guidelines for feedback at an URBAN roundtable in San Francisco in August. Cheryl Najarian Souza is working on data analysis of politicians and how they balance work and family life and how they create laws and policies. Susan Thomson presented the paper, "The Concerto and the Peacock: Ethnographic Fieldwork and the Music of Seraikela Chhau Dance" at the American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting in Chicago during November 2013, and also presented the paper "Musician, Researcher, Bohu: Gender and the Ethnographic Research Process" at the UMass Lowell Gender Studies Conference in February, 2014. During the fall semester, 2013, in partnership with the Tsongas Industrial History Center, she worked with service-learning students in her social anthropology course to update the museum exhibit "Mill Girls and Immigrants" at the Mogan Cultural Center. The exhibit, including profiles of refugees from Iraq, Bhutan, Congo and Burma, opened in Fall 2014. Susan gave a paper about the creation of this exhibit at the American Ethnological Society/Visual Anthropology meeting in Boston, April 2014. 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The Sociological Review - Wiley Online Library A composite character based on information about nearly 350 successful investment bankers, she represents the top 1 percent of earners at her large, global firm. Cat is friendly and highly regarded by her colleagues. She has an impressive educational pedigree as well as a large network of contacts. Yet so do many of her colleagues, who look just as good on paper and have similar networks. For almost four decades, researchers have been studying why some people have an advantage that results from their social contacts and networks. Countless studies have established that it’s important to have valued contacts, and that it’s helpful to build networks that span organizational boundaries, across coworkers, clients, suppliers, and so on. Merluzzi have identified a network pattern that contributes to Cat’s success, and is reflected in her pay. Managers who build bridges rather than cliques earn more than their peers; they’re promoted faster and are happier at their jobs. The pattern: “network oscillation.” “NYSE President: I owe every job I’ve ever had to networking” reads a Fortune headline from 2015. Cat followed researchers’ advice and built up a diverse network of important contacts. “Your net worth is only as good as your network,” claims UK writer Rishi Chowdhury, in Business Insider. Many readers react to such headlines by accumulating more contacts on Linked In, exchanging more business cards, and setting up more luncheons. Having a large network is one thing; the structure of that network, however, is even more important. “This is because not all connections are equally valuable,” Merluzzi explains. “Simply focusing on connection collection is incomplete.” The number of connections you have, online or in real life, is only one part of the story. Another important part of networking is bridging, reaching people outside of your work silo. “Silo” is a sociology term, not one used by the researchers, but it’s instructive here. When employees are grouped together into silos—whether by project or department or location—they get better at what they do, require less instruction and supervision, and ultimately help the organization become more efficient. As people develop specialties, “information inside that group becomes very sticky and tacit—it is difficult to translate to others outside of the group,” says Merluzzi. When information gets stuck in one place, it can lead people at an organization to duplicate efforts—or even work against each other. “Imagine the success of a product line that was developed with little input from customer support, manufacturing, or marketing,” she says. Burt, Merluzzi, and others have found that this disconnection creates an opportunity for people who can build bridges to and from these sticky clusters of information, bridging what Burt terms “structural holes.” Network brokers can bring together otherwise disconnected people who can share valuable and hard-to-get information. Moreover, because they know people in various silos, they can, more than others, identify and communicate where the information would be valuable. Since the 1970s, researchers have been exploring what it means to bridge these gaps. “Relations with contacts in otherwise disconnected groups provide a competitive advantage in detecting and developing rewarding opportunities,” writes Burt, along with University College London’s Martin Kilduff and Erasmus University’s Stefano Tasselli, in a 2013 paper. Scores of studies have shown this to be true, including a global study involving stock analysts, investment bankers, and managers, in which Burt demonstrated that network brokers were paid more, were promoted more quickly, and were more likely to receive kudos. But silos have advantages too, and they go beyond efficiency. As a participant in a “closed network structure,” in the parlance of sociology, you become deeply engaged, developing specialized expertise as well as strong connections with your closest colleagues. Because information moves quickly within these closed cliques, everyone in your group can readily identify a troublemaker or slacker, and as a result, you and your colleagues will be more careful about making trouble or slacking. Building a good reputation is also crucial in a closed-group environment and so, over time, and as you develop relationships, you take great efforts to become credible and trustworthy. While members of other departments may admire your work but quickly forget your name, your colleagues in a closed network have longer memories—their lasting opinions and those of your mutual acquaintances will further motivate you to maintain your reputation. Stanford’s Avner Greif suggested in a 1989 paper that trust and reputations established in closed networks helped pave the way for 11th century medieval trade. To expand their reaches, merchants employed individuals to serve as overseas agents, but it was tough to keep tabs on these agents or keep them from cheating. The merchants formed coalitions, shared information, and pledged to never hire an agent who cheated another coalition member. For a more modern example, Merluzzi suggests thinking about Amazon or e Bay. Sellers earn reputation scores, and while a one-time seller might unload a faulty product on someone, an established seller with high scores wouldn’t want to risk the reputational hit. “In the same way, the risk of buying a used car from a close cousin is much reduced compared to buying from a stranger,” she says. “Imagine that cousin having to face not only you but all the other relatives, knowing he sold you a lemon. There is a big cost, not just to the cousin’s relationship with you but with all of your other mutual family members. Thanksgiving dinner would not be pleasant.” Researchers created composite characters, Bob and Cat, to illustrate what makes some people more successful. Bob and Cat are both bankers with identical networks, but they built their networks differently—and Cat’s network gives her a greater advantage. Sociologists and management scholars have filled volumes comparing the two network structures they term “brokerage” and “closure,” popularly referred to as bridging and bonding. In these matchups, brokerage has tended to win out. Of course, this is context specific—a company that values innovation and new ideas will be more likely to value brokerage, and a company that prioritizes operational efficiency will prefer closure. Yet according to a variety of performance measures, people who can connect valuable, otherwise disconnected contacts in different areas of a firm—in other words, brokers—“tend to do better than people who only talk to the same set of people with the same set of knowledge,” says Merluzzi. “These brokers have gained valuable social capital.” Burt has taught social capital of brokerage and closure to thousands of business-school students, as well as to corporate executives at companies all over the world, and he’s noticed that most students leave his class believing strongly in the power of brokerage. Yet when he looked at various measures of an executive’s performance—salary, promotions, job satisfaction, or something else—it became clear that not all brokers did well. Some excelled, and others failed to realize benefits from the same network structure. The short answer: the most-successful people take advantage of both systems—sometimes they broker, and other times they dive into closed networks. In fact, without this movement back and forth, their networks give them no advantage at all. The researchers arrived at this conclusion by studying the networks of investment bankers. In the mid 1990s, an executive at a large global investment-banking firm asked Burt to help identify why its top women were leaving, and how to prevent it. The firm gave Burt access to a trove of proprietary data pertaining to about 350 of its top-tier investment bankers. These were senior people who were eligible for an annual bonus and whose compensation ranged from a few hundred thousand dollars to several million. Every year, as part of the bonus evaluation process, the firm conducted a survey in which it asked bankers to identify people they had worked closely with in the prior year, and to anonymously rate their experiences with those colleagues as poor, good, very good, or outstanding. The ratings were translated into scores that were used to inform decisions about bonuses and promotions. Burt gathered four years’ worth of these annual ratings, as well as salary and bonus information for the bankers. As this is sensitive data, the researchers don’t disclose the name of the bank in their findings, and all salary information is masked. (To obscure exact dollar amounts, Burt and Merluzzi standardized all salary data.) The researchers used the evaluation data to create sociograms, network maps showing the bankers’ connections and the strength of those connections. Investment bankers proved ideal subjects for a study of brokerage and closure in networking. The bankers in the study typically worked in teams on discrete projects—while advising companies on potential mergers, for instance. In a textbook case of a closed network, team members generally worked closely while on a project, collectively logging long hours and even spending free time together at social or work-related events. Some bankers immediately found another project to work on, while others waited. In some cases, bankers worked part time within the firm or consulted while looking for their next assignment, Burt says. After a period of time, they found a team and devoted themselves to that project. Analyzing salary and bonus packages as well as year-end performance surveys proved revealing for Burt and Merluzzi. Bankers who were able to move between brokering and working in closed networks during the year reaped the greatest rewards. These individuals formed ties across the organization, gaining access to new projects and opportunities. But once they found an opportunity, they quit brokering and engaged deeply in their new project. When that project ended, they once again tapped into their broad network of contacts at the firm to find the next interesting project. Swinging between working intensely on a project and networking more widely did have a cost: these bankers sometimes saw their reputations suffer while they were on the bench. And the compensation data show that these oscillating bankers made the most money over time. The researchers present the actions of two hypothetical executives, Catherine, whom we met earlier, and Robert (Bob). Bob is your classic network broker—he talks with different people every month, and his contacts don’t know each other. He learns a lot of information this way, and most people he meets develop a positive impression of him. Because he moves from one project to another, though, his colleagues do not know him as well. Nevertheless, he has the network that, as Burt noted, many students and executives think they should have. “The way Bob plays his job is with respect to a broad audience,” says Burt. Cat, by contrast, spends two months in a tight-knit group working with other analysts, then spends two months connecting with a variety of people to find the next best project in the firm, and so on. How to network: Three takeaways Research has long established that a person can benefit from building a broad network, and from engaging deeply in a tightly connected group. But Burt and Merluzzi suggest that the most successful people are those who can move in and out of these two different networks over time. What this means for your career: Spending time deeply engaged in a group allows you to develop specialized expertise and foster strong connections with colleagues, which in turn helps you build a positive reputation among a set of coworkers. The annual survey conducted as part of the bonus evaluation process allowed the researchers to essentially map a network of the organization and show who was connected, and how. Doing this, they could recognize the Cats from the Bobs. At a single point in time, Cat may have a similar network to Bob’s; however, she builds hers differently. Cat gains the same information Bob has, but by engaging in closed networks, she also builds a strong reputation within those groups—a reputation that’s slower to evaporate than Bob’s. Because people she’s worked closely with have seen her work and contributions, they like and trust her. When she brings them new information, they listen—and they tell others about her. Several other reasons could explain Cat’s advantage. Brokerage and closure make Cat more nimble, able to quickly respond to new information, with the benefit of insider knowledge. Because Bob continually connects across groups without ever deeply engaging, he is a perpetual outsider. Cat, more accustomed to change, is constantly moving in and out of groups. This in turn can make her more flexible and able to adapt to new ideas. There’s another possibility: while both Bob and Cat have a large set of diverse contacts, Cat is better able to reanimate her wide-reaching contacts when the need arises. Because she spent time inside groups, her contacts are more likely to have mutual acquaintances, making it easier for Cat to call on them in the future. It’s easy to see how Cat’s behavior could translate in different industries. Let’s say that Cat, instead of being an investment banker, is an engineer who worked on several teams within Apple, including the group that developed the i Phone 6s. That model set a first-weekend i Phone sales record at its debut, but at that point, Cat had already spent a few months talking to other group leads within Apple to find another project. By brokering with people in various other departments, and even outside of the company, Cat may know what other products are coming down the pipeline. And because she has worked closely with some of the people in those groups, she may have a well-developed understanding of those products, or relationships with people who can help educate her. Cat will bring an informed perspective to the next product meeting—and might come back with the next hit, earning her accolades, a spot on that product team, and a higher salary. Employees of all kinds can take a lesson from Cat, by learning to move between networking broadly and diving deeply into teams over time. Companies can also learn from Cat, by encouraging employees to build Cat-like networks. Doing so could help individuals, and their employers, stay nimble. The Sociological Review. From 1st January 2017, The Sociological Review will be published by SAGE Publications. Please visit their website here for more information. @TheSocReview.
Annual Review of Sociology Home Malcolm Brynin is Reader in Sociology at the Institute of Social Research, University of Essex. His main research interests are in education and skills, ethnic and gender wage gaps, and the family. His work has been published in the Francisco Perales is Research Fellow in Family Dynamics at the ARC Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course, at the Institute for Social Science Research (University of Queensland). His current research interests include the impact of life course transitions on gender-based socio-economic inequality, differences in life outcomes by sexual identity, and the effect of early life course family structure on children's development. His recent work has been published in journals such as The gender segregation of occupations is an enduring feature of the labour market, and pay in female-dominated occupations remains lower than in male-dominated occupations. However, recent changes in the occupational structure have possibly altered the relationship between occupational segregation and the gender pay gap. Women’s skills are increasingly in demand, and this is reducing the gender wage gap. We explore this premise using individual- and occupation-level Labour Force Survey and household panel data from Britain augmented with an innovative proxy indicator of productivity across occupations. The wage effects of occupational feminization are not as high as previously shown once this indicator is taken into account. Additionally, we find evidence that such wage effects are evolving into more complex processes, including differing impacts for graduates and non-graduates as well as for employees in graduate and non-graduate jobs. Claims that gender segregation is losing importance as a structuring factor in labour-market outcomes are therefore accurate. However, this applies mostly to women in jobs requiring high-level skills. Segregation continues to lower pay substantially for women in occupations requiring limited skills. The gender segregation of occupations is a long-standing feature of labour markets and is held to have pronounced wage impacts. Occupations where women predominate generally pay less than those where men predominate ( England , 1994 ; Blau and Kahn, 2003 ; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009 ; Levanon, England and Allison, 2009 ). Extensive research has sought to unveil the reasons for this, often based on a small number of important theoretical ideas, in particular human capital theory ( Tam, 1997 ), gender role theory ( Lips, 2012 ; Ochsenfeld, 2014 ), and devaluation theory ( England, 1992 , 2010 ; Perales, 2013 ). , 2010 ; American Association of University Women, 2012 ). Rising female education has been cited as an important mediating factor in these developments ( Weichselbaumer and Winter-Emer, 2005 ; Goldin, 2008 ). However, the role of education remains highly uncertain. For instance, recent research in the USA has unveiled a strong negative relationship between occupational feminization and earnings for the highly qualified ( Hegewisch, Liepmann and Hartmann, 2010 ). Even less clear is whether the link between occupational gender segregation and the gender pay gap is itself weakening, as suggested by Charles and Grusky (2004) . One problem is that the decline in segregation itself is not consistent over time ( Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey, 2012 ) or across countries ( Rubery, 2008 : 299–300; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009 : 34–37). Further, insofar as the narrowing of the gender wage gap is the result of the growth in female skills, the decline in gender segregation could be linked to the spread of egalitarian gender ideologies and mainstreaming policies. It is unlikely that a single cause can explain the changing relationship between segregation and the gender wage gap. Women’s education has risen and this might have enabled women to enter professional jobs previously dominated by men so that such jobs have become increasingly integrated ( England, 2010 ). However, it is also possible that shifts in the occupational structure have benefited women through creating more high-level ‘female’ jobs. There has been a long-run decline in ‘male-typed’ jobs involving physical strength or technical know-how ( Oppenheimer 1970 ; Kucera and Milberg, 2000 ; Goldin, 2002 ), and this has been accompanied by the rise of higher-end ‘post-industrial’, predominantly female occupations ( Esping-Andersen, 1993 )—now highly professionalized ( de Ruijter, van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2003 ). Primary school teaching and social care are prime examples. They have both in the past been tainted by low status and pay; yet, in many countries these jobs now require graduate education. This enables women, who have historically favoured such work, to obtain higher pay on average than they would otherwise ( Disney and Gosling, 1998 ; Dustmann and van Soest, 1998 ; Budria, 2010 ). Nevertheless, this process only works if women specialize in skills which are in growing demand ( Tam, 1997 ; Krymkowski and Mintz, 2007 ). While existing studies have focused chiefly on individual skills, we use British data to test whether the wage effects of occupational feminization diminish when we control for an occupational level measure of productivity. We find that the role of occupational gender segregation in wage determination is weakening not only through women’s growing educational advantage, but because an increasing proportion of university-educated women work in highly productive professions. We therefore have a story of occupations and a story of gender, which intersect yet remain distinct. Women are still over-represented in poorly paid occupations. Some claim that this is chiefly because of women having lower human capital or productivity ( Polachek, 1976 , 1981 ; Tam, 1997 ; Polavieja 2008 ). However, the rise in female education makes this general argument increasingly difficult to maintain; women’s growing educational attainments are often cited as a major driver of the decline in the gender wage gap ( Goldin, 2002 , 2008 ). Nevertheless, education is a necessary but not sufficient condition for change in gender inequality to take place. For example, access to education is still gendered by prestige of institution and field of study ( Hakim, 1998 ; Booth and Kee, 2011 ). For one British cohort (born 1958), Joshi and Paci (1998) find that educational achievement explains only about 10 per cent of the gender wage gap. In another British study, education explains 7 per cent compared with 62 per cent explained by gender itself ( Olsen , 2010 ). Many studies fail to find a consistent or strong impact of education on the gender pay gap (e.g. It is implicit in the concept of the ‘glass ceiling’ ( Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2007 ) that highly educated women’s work is devalued (insofar as being female limits promotion opportunities). In the USA at least the gender wage gap is larger in more highly paid occupations ( Evertsson , 2009 ; Hegewisch and Liepmann, 2010 ), while the feminization of occupations appears to reduce returns to education for women in Britain ( Joshi and Paci, 1998 : 71–96), Germany ( Aisenbrey and Brückner, 2008 : 644), and the Netherlands ( de Ruijter, van Doorne-Huiskes and Schippers, 2003 ). Nevertheless, the predictions of devaluation theory neither accord with the observed fall in the gender wage gap ( Jackson, 2008 ), nor with variation in segregation and occupational wage gaps across countries ( Bettio, 2002 ; Bettio and Verashchagina, 2009 ). ‘Female’ work is not paid uniformly poorly across countries, and many jobs in which women predominate are not stereotypically ‘feminine’ ( Hakim, 1998 ). Further, gender-integrated occupations are generally better paid ( Hakim, 1998 ; Cotter , 2004 ; Magnusson, 2013 ) and more prestigious ( Magnusson, 2009 ) than not only female-dominated but also male-dominated occupations. Occupational gender segregation has also been shown to be positively related to measures of female empowerment at the aggregate level ( Blackburn, Jarman and Brooks, 2000 ). Our argument is that women have a comparative advantage in ‘skill’ (defined as the converse of ‘brawn’) and therefore tend to select into skill-intensive occupations. If so, then skill-biased technological change ( Berman, Bound and Machin, 1997 , Card and Di Nardo, 2002 ), previously in favour of men, might raise the demand for women’s capabilities and qualifications, thus contributing to a narrowing of the gender wage gap at the top of the wage distribution. This has been observed in both developing countries ( Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan, 2012 ; Bhalotra, Fernandez-Sierra and Venkataramani, 2015 ) and developed countries ( Harmon, Walker and Westergaard-Nielsen, 2001 ), and may explain why desegregation has occurred primarily in middle-class jobs ( England, 2010 ). Koppera and Mehta’s ( 2014 : 9) analysis of the Current Population Survey in the USA explains the college boom in terms of shifts in the ‘feminization of education-intensive jobs’. Female enrolments are associated with increases in typically female jobs rather than with higher-level jobs in general. There is a connection running from gendered employment trends to gendered educational trends rather than the other way round. Whether female educational investments are in skill-intensive sectors is rarely tested empirically. Some possible examples are given by Magnusson (2013) for Sweden. Like Hakim (1998) , she finds that both men and women receive the highest wages in integrated occupations (i.e. occupations in which 30–50 per cent of workers are women), including some health and teaching professionals. Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey ( 2012 : 136, 172) show that in the USA, during an enormous expansion of professional jobs from around 1970 to 2000, (white) male representation in this general sector fell, with the difference being made up predominantly by (white) women. Even ‘caring’ occupations, deemed to be the heart of the devaluation process ( England, Budig and Folbre, 2002 ; England, 2005 ), are witnessing change of some benefit to women ( Esping-Andersen, 1993 ; Goldin, 2008 ). For instance, the ‘family going public’ involves the professionalization of care work, mostly female dominated. As one example, care of the elderly requires increasing skills as a result of more client-focused approaches. These involve increasing attention to the emotional and social needs of clients, and a wider range of creative and interpersonal carer skills ( Dench, La Valle and Evans, 1999 ). Dwyer (2013) shows that in the USA from 1983 to 2007, demand for care work contributed considerably to growth in both the lowest quintile of occupational wages and the highest. Magnusson (2009) finds the relationship between care work and both occupational prestige and wages in Sweden to be positive; female-dominated ‘interpersonal service work’, in contrast, received both low prestige and pay. A counterargument has been proposed by Mandel and Semyonov (2005) , who make the case that while the expansion of women’s work, predominantly in the public sector, has boosted female employment, wage compression in the sector has prevented women from obtaining highly paid jobs equivalent to those in the private sector, thus contributing to, not reducing, gender wage inequality. However, it is difficult to demonstrate that women would otherwise have achieved better pay in high-level private-sector occupations, for instance in finance. It has also been demonstrated that through increased entry into ‘female’ professional jobs, women have achieved high-level managerial positions that might not have been attainable otherwise ( England, 2010 ). The problem is not the public sector, but the effects on gender equality of continued privatization ( Rubery, Smith and Fagan, 1999 ). We note here, before presentation of our findings, that in the UK data set we use, mean pay from 1993 to 2008 is higher in the public than in the private sector for both men and women, while the gender wage gap is higher in the latter. On the other hand, restriction of the analysis to the relative highly paid (over £10 per hour) virtually eliminates these differences. We have argued that segregation favours more-educated women while disadvantaging those who are less educated. There is an important methodological point here, in that the observed decline in the relationship between segregation and the gender wage gap masks two opposed processes. Segregation still remains important because it favours highly-skilled women on the one hand but remains damaging for the less skilled. In respect of the former, women’s occupational preferences that have been historically to their detriment might now be working in their favour. A corollary of this is that we need to distinguish between women’s work and women’s skills. With rare exceptions such as fashion modelling (male or female), but also following the decline of heavy industries, there is little work that both men and women cannot in principle each do effectively ( Hakim, 1998 ). There are no such things as ‘female’ or ‘male’ skills. These are social artefacts derived from processes of segregation. This is changing, we argue, but not because segregation is declining and more women are doing ‘men’s work’ (a process that is in fact extremely slow), nor because women are now as well educated as men (which would not help if women’s skills are devalued). However, if the underlying principle of devaluation theory is that women’s work is considered to be of lower value than men’s—because historically ‘femininity’ has been attributed lower value—then it is inevitable that the skills associated with the work that women do in typically female occupations will also be considered of lower value. The change is the result of the fact that the skills that women typically apply in segregated occupations are increasingly in demand. Devaluation is not an immutable element of the social structure. Occupational gender segregation is in this climate about poorly skilled women being in dead-end jobs. To make a simple but important point, gender equality cannot come about through wage equality based on highly educated women’s skills matching those of men as long as women continue to be over-represented in low-paid occupations ( Joshi and Paci, 1998 : 71–96; OECD, 2002 ; Blau and Kahn, 2003 ; Rubery, 2008 ). We use information from two large-scale UK surveys. The main data set is the Labour Force Survey (LFS), a repeated cross-section survey of individuals, which supplies detailed information on employment and has a substantial sample size. We use LFS data from 1993 to 2008 (annual, though constructed out of quarterly surveys). The second data set is the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We use information from the first 17 waves, comprising the period 1991–2007. This allows us to complement the LFS analysis by minimizing the confounding effects of individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity. Our approach introduces two variables that measure in some way the pool of skills in the labour force. The first is the graduate density of occupations, operationalized as the proportion of graduate workers in an occupation—with graduates defined as holders of first or higher degrees from higher education institutions. Graduate density raises wages controlling for individual education. However, its wage effects are sometimes negative, which implies overcrowding ( Brynin, 2002 ). If the supply of graduates rises in line with demand for high-status occupations more than their prospective economic value, this leads to over-qualification. This might especially apply to women tied by family responsibilities ( Bobbitt-Zeher, 2011 ). As Ochsenfeld (2014) points out, sex-specific characteristics that are altered by technological and organizational developments are often unobserved. We therefore add a second measure that better reflects productivity, which we define for our purpose as factors that enhance wage growth within occupations. As explained below, we use occupation-level time-series wage regressions to extract the fixed effect of the residuals and use it as an indicator of underlying occupation-specific time-invariant factors that influence wages. It should be noted that neither effect is solely that of occupational productivity. Graduate density is the proportion of graduates in an occupation and is therefore primarily a measure of skill supply. This need not relate directly to productivity—for instance, if supply is driven by the demand for the prestige of a degree rather than the wages it attracts. The fixed-effect measure, in contrast, captures unmeasured aspects of wage growth at the occupational level. We would therefore expect it to relate more closely to differential productivity. However, the unmeasured aspects of productivity picked up by the occupational fixed effects (OFE) depend on the information that we are able to enter into the right-hand side of the occupation-level equation. While this is extensive, there are factors, such as technology usage at work, which we are unable to measure. where subscripts o and t stand for occupation and time, respectively, W represents mean deflated gross hourly wages in the occupation, F is the proportion of women in the occupation (occupational feminization), G is the proportion of graduates in the occupation (graduate density), C is a vector of time-varying control variables, V is an error term, and β is the usual stochastic error term. We estimate average occupational wages by regressing deviations from occupational means over time in the independent variables on deviations from the occupational mean over time in the dependent variable: ), which are averaged out of the above equation, are then retrieved. The resulting term, our OFE, captures pounds per hour in an occupation over or under model prediction, net of all observable factors. This will be used as a proxy for occupational skill demands in later models. The model in Equation (5) controls for occupation-level, but not for individual-level, unobserved factors that determine wages. The model in Equation (6) , which we term a ‘dual fixed-effect’ model, simultaneously controls for person-specific and occupation-specific unobserved heterogeneity in wages. Occupational gender segregation and the gender wage gap have both declined over the period examined in this study, as is apparent from LFS data presented in Figure 1 . Between 19, the overall gender difference in inflation-adjusted hourly wages decreased substantially from £2.2 to £1.1. The within-occupation gap (not shown) fell from £1.63 to £0.82. With inflation-adjusted average pay rising, the gender wage gap as a proportion of average pay decreased over the period from 23.4 to 10.3 per cent. At the same time, a less impressive though important fall in the degree of occupational gender segregation took place. The value of the Duncan and Duncan Index of Dissimilarity was 0.58 in 1993, indicating that an estimated 58 per cent of men and women would need to change occupations for the gender composition of all occupations to reflect the gender composition of the labour force. Extreme forms of gender concentration also declined. For example, the proportion of employees working in occupations where women were at least 75 per cent of workers fell from 25 to 20 per cent. Further, the correlation between occupational feminization and the within-occupation gender wage gap (male minus female hourly wage) measured at the occupational level is negative, so the gender wage gap is smaller in more-feminized occupations. In fact, the magnitude of this negative correlation strengthened over the period from −0.05 (non-significant) to −0.30 (highly significant). These descriptive analyses suggest that women’s poor wage position relative to men is both declining and decreasingly determined by occupational gender segregation. We now examine whether this is related to gendered skill distributions and unobserved productivity. Most research shows a negative correlation between gender segregation and wages. Results in Table 1 from the regression models described in Equation (1) , using LFS data at the occupation level, clearly reflect this negative relationship. However, occupational feminization has a stronger negative wage impact for men than women, and more so in the later period. Working in female-dominated occupations therefore results in lower within-occupation wage gaps between male and female workers. The problem is that women by definition prevail in feminized occupations. : Dependent variable: Average deflated male/female hourly wages in the occupation. Controls: average age, average tenure, proportion of workers from an ethnic minority, proportion of workers with school-leaving qualifications. Just as men are more affected than women by the negative wage impact of feminization, if in small numbers, not all women are equally affected. The table also shows that the magnitude of these negative effects is small when compared with the effects of graduate density. Individual-level wage regression models using the LFS are presented in Tables 2 (men) and 3 (women). Their estimates are consistent with the above results. The impact of occupational feminization on wages is nearly always negative and, in the more complex specifications, more so for men than women. The effect of graduate density, as expected, is positive, and slightly favours women, while its effect again far outweighs that of gender-based segregation. It seems to matter more whether men and women work in graduate-typed occupations than in female-typed occupations. This is apparent also in that the negative effect of segregation on women reduces substantially when controlling for graduate density. : Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-time job, tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. All coefficients are statistically significant at Further support for our general argument is provided by an interaction term between feminization and graduate density in the third column of Tables 2 and 3 . Its sign is negative for men but positive for women. Interpretation is aided by visual inspection of Figure 2 . Men are always penalized for working in feminized occupations at all levels of the graduate density distribution, though the penalty is larger in graduate-typed feminized occupations. In contrast, this combination benefits women, albeit only slightly. Women do not on average gain from working in male-typed occupations but perform better in graduate female-typed occupations. This is a key result in terms of the arguments presented above. : Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education, married, permanent job, full-time job, tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. All coefficients are statistically significant at It is nevertheless unclear, amongst other things, how much this is the result of unobserved occupational productivity, which might be either directly or indirectly gendered. Occupations become more graduate presumably in part because employers increasingly demand graduate skills, but social demand for education might relate only poorly to employer demand ( Brynin, 2013 ; Koppera and Mehta, 2014 ). Use of the indicator of underlying productivity proposed in Equation (4) —the OFE—enables us to get a clearer picture. We add this term in column 4 and hence fit the model depicted in Equation (5) . Its effect appears small, but this is relative to the variable’s range (−£3.7 to £5.5). The result means that for every one-pound increase in unmeasured productive potential in an occupation, hourly wages increase by roughly 8 per cent. This favours men insofar as they tend to work in occupations with both higher wages and higher productivity. Nevertheless, the occupational fixed-effect term has an equally positive effect on the wages of both men and women. In this sense, productivity performance within occupations does not exacerbate gender inequality. Also of note is that the inclusion of the OFE in the model greatly reduces the predicted wage advantage from work in graduate occupations. This implies that most of the graduate density effects are the result of differences in occupational productivity. More important, for both men and women the negative effects of occupational feminization on wages can no longer be observed, which suggests that the gendering of work does not influence their wages. The apparent wage penalties previously associated with occupational feminization result from a link between occupational gender segregation and productivity. We conclude our main empirical analyses by fitting the ‘dual fixed-effect’ model suggested in Equation (6) , using the BHPS. Results are presented in Tables 4 (men) and 5 (women). The predicted wage effects of graduate density, occupational feminization, and the occupational fixed-effect term are, with some exceptions, similar to those estimated in the previous specification using LFS data. First, the wage effect of occupational feminization on wages remains negative and statistically significant for both men and women in the presence of an encompassing set of statistical controls, including measures of graduate density, unobserved occupation-level productivity, and skill demands, as well as unobserved individual-level skills or capability. This provides indirect evidence for the continued devaluation of female-typed lines of work. Nevertheless, the estimated impacts of occupational feminization reduce to −0.04 for men and −0.07 for women, which means that a full reversal in the sex composition of a worker’s occupation from 100 per cent ‘male’ to 100 per cent ‘female’ would only result in a 4–7 per cent contraction in his/her wages. This is substantially smaller than in much of the comparable worth literature (e.g. Second, once the fixed effects are included in the model, graduate density has no wage impact for either men or women. This suggests that wage-enhancing unobserved factors are a better proxy for occupation-level skill demands than is the proportion of graduates in an occupation. Our theoretical set-up suggested that the wage effects of occupational feminization may be non-linear across different levels of skill demand and supply. We test this proposition by estimating models analogous to those in Tables 2 and 3 that (i) differentiate between graduates and non-graduates on the one hand and those who work in occupations with high and low high-graduate density on the other, and (ii) add second and third-order polynomials of the occupational feminization variable to capture non-linear effects. The results are presented in Table 6 and can be more easily interpreted by visual inspection of Figure 3 . : Dependent variable: Log of deflated hourly wages. Controls: Age, age squared, education (columns 3 and 4), married, permanent job, full-time job, tenure, industry, public sector, firm size, region. * Taking non-graduates first, increasing levels of feminization reduce both men’s and women’s wages for at least a part of the range. The same applies to individuals who do not work in graduate occupations. For graduates and those working in graduate occupations, the non-linear effects are much more visible, though relatively small in magnitude. Male graduates gain from working in gender-integrated relative to male-dominated occupations but, at higher levels of feminization, their wages worsen. As we have stated, education alone is not sufficient to counteract the devaluing effect of ‘women’s work’. However, where this work demands high-level skills, the effect is generally positive, above all for women, as we see from the uppermost curve in Figure 3 . These results further demonstrate that graduate status does not protect against high levels of feminization, whereas working in a graduate occupation does. Gender-based occupational segregation is clearly an important organizing principle within labour markets. There is overwhelming evidence for this, and indeed, we know much about the factors that have historically led to its emergence and preservation. A large body of research has demonstrated that doing ‘women’s work’ has a negative impact on men’s and women’s pay, but how recent changes in the economic structure have affected these relationships is much less clear. Women, we argue, increasingly work in occupations to which the changing economic environment has been mostly beneficial. First, we present important evidence of a rapid decline in the gender wage gap in the British labour market between 19. This movement towards pay equality was accompanied by a (not so impressive) decrease in occupational gender segregation. Between 19, the Index of Dissimilarity fell from 0.58 to 0.50. This makes the British example an interesting case study. At the level of both occupations and individuals, our results indicate that the underlying demand for skills (in part captured by the percentage of graduates in each occupation but primarily by unobserved factors that influence wage growth within occupations) are gradually eliminating the predictive impact of occupational gender segregation on wages. On the other hand, the distinct and patterned effects of occupational feminization on wages in previous decades are not disappearing; they are instead evolving into a more complex constellation of processes, including differing impacts for graduates and non-graduates, and for employees in graduate and non-graduate jobs, as well as non-linear relationships across the spectrum of feminization. In our view, this makes understanding the role of gender and the gendering of occupations in determining labour market outcomes more rather than less important. Our research contributes to current knowledge on underlying changes in the occupational structure, in particular through the use of OFE to approximate productivity. Nevertheless, this remains only an indirect proxy measure, and we cannot be certain what this represents: productivity, demand for skills, technological change, or demand for particular goods and services? There are also clearly other wage-enhancing factors that may be important. Above all, this measure is not informative as to the specific types of skill that play a role in wage determination processes. Nevertheless, our findings suggest that researchers should perhaps shift focus from the study of the extent and impacts of occupational segregation to the examination of gendered process of occupational change, in particular to what this means for changing valuations of both women’s work and women’s skills. These two concepts have different implications for women. An earlier period of exploitation of female labour is giving way to an inexorable process of change. Previous research has stressed the importance of sociopolitical attitude change and gender mainstreaming policies in improving the situation of women in the labour market ( England, 2010 ). Our findings complement this body of evidence by highlighting the role of exogenous transformations in the occupational structure and the distribution of skills, which could for instance reflect technological change or shifts in the global division of labour. These have in principle little to do with gender ; yet, they have been important drivers of current trends towards gender equality at work. In this sense, arguments for a declining significance of gender in work outcomes are not misguided. Whether that will remain the case, though, particularly with the emergence of widespread economic recession, is uncertain. The improvement in women’s labour market standing has been steady but not overwhelming; changes in the occupational structure have also almost exclusively benefited highly educated women. Even if these women are an increasing proportion of the female workforce, many poorly educated women work for little reward. Thus, while women’s work is not devalued across the board, the power of occupational segregation to reduce the welfare of women unable to benefit from the rising demand for female skills is a continuing concern. 1 An alternative view is offered by ‘queuing theory’ (Thurow, 1979). This posits that women are concentrated in a smaller number of occupations than men, which increases competition amongst women for jobs and also employers’ power to set comparatively low wages in female-dominated occupations ( Fernandez and Moors, 2008 ). are undervalued, there should be excess female overqualification. Overqualification is common amongst both men and women ( Borghans and de Grip, 2000 ; Korpi and Tahlin 2009 ), but there is only limited evidence of a gender differential in its incidence or wage effects (e.g. Olsen 3 It must be noted that not all available research evidence supports this notion. For instance, de Ruijter, van Doorne-Huiskes, and Schippers (2003) find that even though female-dominated occupations often suffer labour shortages, wages in female-dominated occupations where skills are in demand are in fact relatively low. This is however the Dutch case, where regulatory forces have a strong wage impact. 4 Koppera and Mehta (2014) also find, as does Goldin (2008) , that what benefits men in the long term is work experience. With low work experience, the college premium is almost equal between men and women, but as this rises, so does the male advantage. This may be responsible for the higher returns to education for men noted above in several countries. 5 A specific example of change in the structure of an occupation in Britain is the printing industry, a traditionally male-dominated, skilled, highly paid environment. Technological developments that made this industry obsolete simultaneously raised the demand for computer skills, and therefore the rewards offered in highly computerized, less male-typed occupations such as journalism, graphic design, and publishing ( Cockburn, 1983 ; Brynin, 2006 ). 6 The British occupational coding system underwent substantial modification from SOC90 to SOC2000 in 2000, which means that there is little comparability between specific occupations before and after this. Our analysis is, though, not of specific occupations but of occupational characteristics at a comparable level of occupational aggregation, minor occupational groups (81 in SOC90 and 88 in SOC2000). While it is possible that the coding change has some influence on the results, this is unlikely, as robustness checks using several time points show consistent trends. 7 This tackles in a different way the problem addressed by the multilevel models of de Ruijter, van Doorne-Huiskes, and Schippers (2003) . These similarly allow for simultaneous variation at both the individual and occupational levels, but make strong distributional assumptions about the occupation fixed effects. 8 The mean feminization level is substantially higher amongst female non-graduates (68 per cent) than amongst female graduates (57 per cent). This could suggest that educated women gain from doing ‘men’s’ work, but as the figures for men are only 27 and 38 per cent, respectively, the implication is a growth in ‘female’ graduate jobs. This research was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) through the Research Centre on Micro-Social Change (Mi So C) (award no. ES/L009153/1) and the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Children and Families over the Life Course (project number CE140100027). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not of the ESRC or the Australian Research Council. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( ), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. Annual Review of Sociology. Explicating Divided Approaches to Gentrification and Growing Income Inequality. compliance and persuasion relevant to nonresponse error, sociological theories relevant to nonresponse error, and cognitive and social psychological theories relevant to measurement error. Read the Article.
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